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INTERNATIONAL LAWYERS AS DISRUPTERS OF
CORRUPTION: BUSINESS AND HUMAN
RIGHTS IN AFRICA’S MOST POPULOUS
COUNTRY—NIGERIA
Jayanth K. Krishnan1*
ABSTRACT—Be it bribery, embezzlement, or the abuse of public trust,
corruption poses a major challenge to global security and democratic
governance, along with undermining the rule of law, especially within the
Global South. Key to this phenomenon is understanding how lawyers are
enabling but also disrupting this epidemic. Unfortunately, the literature on
this subject is lacking. This study, therefore, offers a nuanced story of
globalization and the complicated role that lawyers play in corruption, by
relying on the case study of Nigeria—a crucial Global South market that has
the largest population on the African continent. While Nigeria has been able
to remain a democracy since 1999 (albeit fragilely), private sector and
government officials, including the current Nigerian president, concede that
corruption is the country’s biggest problem. At the same time, as this study
demonstrates, in Nigeria today there is a small but growing group of globally
experienced lawyers who are aggressively resisting the entrenched
corruption that besieges this environment. By virtue of the opportunities
provided by globalization, this cohort is not bound to the parochial interests
that have long harmed Nigeria. Yet, these lawyers also work within a larger
profession that is conservative, complicated, and at times itself corrupt. Thus,
to what extent do these factors affect the ability of these globally focused
lawyers to enact change? The answer to this question is critical because it
helps to unlock an enduring puzzle as to which agents are best situated to
lead a country out of its mired, corrupt history and onto the global stage as a
respected power. For other nations, particularly in the Global South, that are
also seeking to strengthen their rule of law regimes, the lessons from this
1*
Milt and Judi Stewart Professor of Law and Director of the Stewart Center on the Global Legal
Profession, Indiana University-Bloomington Maurer School of Law. (Jkrishna@indiana.edu). The
author received incredibly constructive and supportive insights from Sara Dezalay, Vitor Dias, Marc
Galanter, Charles Geyh, Ethan Michelson, Christiana Ochoa, Austen Parrish, and Lauren Robel.
Adebola Adesanya provided invaluable research support. Finally, great appreciation is given to all the
respondents in Nigeria who educated the author on the state of corruption and legal affairs over the last
many years. To comply with confidentiality requirements from Indiana University’s Institutional
Review Board, their identities are anonymized where so requested.
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study will be instructive in determining whether lawyers who value—and are
part of—global networks are capable of curbing corruption within their own
domestic contexts.
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INTRODUCTION
A major challenge confronting global security and democratic
governance involves the manner in which corruption is undermining the rule
of law. Be it bribery, embezzlement, or the general abuse of power for
personal benefit, corruption upsets the stability of societies and contributes
to division and inequality, particularly in the Global South, or what has been
called the developing or “third world.” Indeed, where the rule of law in a
society has been damaged by corruption, there are profound effects: fewer
human rights protections, inadequate social welfare services, and a decline
of public trust in government institutions.
A key component in understanding how corruption affects the rule of
law is the examination of the behavior of lawyers. As actors sworn to uphold
and advance the law, lawyers are expected to carry out justice and promote
fairness and equity.2 At the same time, their privileged positions expose them
to the core enticements that fuel corruption. Studying the intersection of
2
See AUSTIN SARAT AND STUART SCHEINGOLD, CAUSE LAWYERS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS (2006)
[hereinafter SCHEINGOLD AND SARAT 2006]. See generally SARAT TERENCE C. HALLIDAY AND LUCIEN
KARPIK, LAWYERS AND THE RISE OF WESTERN POLITICAL LIBERALISM: EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA
FROM THE EIGHTEENTH TO TWENTIETH CENTURIES (1998); STUART SCHEINGOLD AND AUSTIN SARAT,
SOMETHING TO BELIEVE IN: POLITICS, PROFESSIONALISM, AND CAUSE LAWYERING (2004) [hereinafter
SCHEINGOLD AND SARAT 2004].
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corruption, the rule of law, and the workings of lawyers is extremely timely.
Numerous countries in the Global South are becoming epicenters for foreign
investment. Thus, having a local set of internationally attuned lawyers in
these countries’ vibrant “global cities,”3 as Saskia Sassen describes them, to
meet the opportunities (and challenges) that such foreign investors offer has
become increasingly important. However, the corrosive, enduring presence
of corruption in much of the Global South is diluting excitement and giving
pause to many who were once great enthusiasts.4 Therefore, empirically
examining the legal profession at this moment is crucial for determining how
the rule of law can be promoted and then sustained within this complicated
region.
Unfortunately, conventional discourse ignores the nuances of what
lawyers do and how they operate. Too often, lawyers are depicted as little
more than “hired guns” who intentionally confuse, obfuscate, and
prevaricate—eroding the rule of law and furthering corruption. 5 Influential
scholarly literature dating back to the 1970s (and continuing to this day) has
denounced lawyers for adversely affecting the enterprise that is the rule of
law.6 Under this stereotype, lawyers hold no lofty ambitions regarding
democratic preservation or the promotion of the rule of law. As evidence,
critics point to examples where lawyers have political control or are political
insiders, and where the result is constant infighting and endless deadlock.7
In reality, however, this school of thought is inadequate; it diminishes
the significance of lawyers by failing to account for their notable
contributions, especially within the Global South. In fact, a counter-narrative
has developed to challenge conventional wisdom.8 But this second stream of
research has often gone to the other extreme, positioning lawyers as messiahlike saviors of the rule of law and the democratic process. The
misrepresentation of lawyers by both sides has led to inaccuracies being
conveyed to policymakers, judges, scholars, the media, and the general
public.
3

See Saskia Sassen, The Global City: Introducing a Concept, 11 BROWN J. WORLD AFF. 27 (2005).
See discussion infra Sections II and III.
5
For two classic studies on this point, see, e.g., Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration
Ideals and Client Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L. J. 470 (1976); Stephen
Wexler, Practicing Law for Poor People, 79 YALE L. J. 1049, 1054 (1970). More recently, see WALTER
OLSON, SCHOOLS FOR MISRULE: LEGAL ACADEMIA AND AN OVERLAWYERD AMERICA (2011).
6
See, e.g., supra note 5. See also MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS 270 (1994);
JOEL HANDLER, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND THE LEGAL SYSTEM: A THEORY OF LAW REFORM AND
SOCIAL CHANGE (1978); JACK KATZ, POOR PEOPLE’S LAWYERS IN TRANSITION (1982); GERALD P.
LÓPEZ, REBELLIOUS LAWYERING: ONE CHICANO’S VISION OF PROGRESSIVE LAW PRACTICE (1992);
SUSAN M. OLSON, CLIENTS AND LAWYERS: SECURING THE RIGHTS OF DISABLED PERSONS (1984).
7
See supra note 6.
8
See supra note 2. See also discussion infra Section I.B.
4
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As such, this study proposes an alternative vision. By focusing on the
country of Nigeria, an oil-rich Global South market that has the largest
population on the African continent,9 this study offers a new approach to
analyze the broader themes discussed thus far. To its credit, Nigeria has been
able to remain a democracy since 1999—albeit fragilely. However, private
sector and government officials, including the current Nigerian president
(himself a former military ruler in the 1980s), concede that corruption is the
country’s biggest problem, fueling massive socio-economic inequality and
the well-known Boko Haram insurgency in the Northeast.10 Public opinion
polls conducted by the MacArthur Foundation, Gallup, Pew Research
Center, and even Nigeria’s own Federal Bureau of Statistics all concur.11
Making this predicament even more seemingly intractable is that corruption
in Nigeria has deep historical roots. It was pervasive during the country’s
military years (1966–1979 and 1983–1999), as well as during its brief,
previous eras of democracy (1960–1966 and 1979–1983).12
Therefore, can lawyers help stem corruption within a society that has
suffered from its destructive presence? If so, which lawyers in particular?
Based on extensive field research in Nigeria,13 this study argues that there is
9

Nigeria Population, WORLDOMETER, https://www.worldometers.info/world-population/nigeriapopulation/ (last visited Mar. 3, 2020).
10
Corruption is Nigeria’s worst problem—Buhari, PREMIUM TIMES (Jan. 12, 2017),
https://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/220324-corruption-nigerias-worst-problembuhari.html.
11
U.N. Office of Drugs and Crime, Corruption in Nigeria: Bribery: Public Experience and Response
(2017). See also Public Opinion on Corruption in Nigeria, MACARTHUR FOUNDATION (Aug. 10, 2016),
https://www.macfound.ORG/press/publications/public-opinion-corruption-nigeria/; Jay Loschky, Ahead
of Poll, Few Nigerians Trust in Elections, GALLUP NEWS (Jan. 13, 2015),
https://news.gallup.com/poll/180914/ahead-poll-few-nigerians-trust-elections.aspx; Jacob Poushter, 6
Facts about Public Opinion in Nigeria before Election Day, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Mar. 24, 2015),
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/03/24/as-nigerians-head-to-the-polls-6-facts-about-publicopinion/.
12
Jayanth K. Krishnan & Kunle Ajagbe, Legal Activism in the Face of Political Challenges: The
Nigerian Case, 42 J. LEGAL PROF. 197 (2018).
13
The author has spent extensive time in Nigeria dating back to 2010. In particular, during different
portions of the summers of 2017 and 2018, the author conducted research in Lagos and Abuja, Nigeria
under approval from Indiana University’s Institutional Review Board. Interview data with 26 different
lawyers from the Nigerian Bar Association were gathered, particularly those in key leadership positions
of the national association and the Section on Business Law (SBL), which will be discussed below. In
addition, the author has spent time at the Nigerian Law School, the University of Lagos Law Faculty, and
BAZE University (Abuja), where he met with legal scholars and adjunct professors who provided him
scholarly perspectives and original documentations on how corruption has affected the rule of law in
Nigeria. Also as part of his research-gathering, the author interviewed key governmental policymakers at
the state and federal levels (numbering 12 in total), as well as key SANs—Senior Advocates of Nigeria—
who, as described in the text below are considered the most elite level of litigators within the country (10
in total). Finally, the author was invited to present his views on the legal profession and globalization to
the SBL on two separate occasions: at the annual conferences in 2017 and 2018. During each of these
meetings, the author met and interviewed a combined total of 36 lawyers, mostly those who were younger
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a small but growing group of globally aware lawyers within the country who
see themselves as nation builders and who are aggressively resisting the
entrenched corruption that besieges this environment. By virtue of the
opportunities provided by globalization, this cohort is not bound to the
parochial interests that have harmed Nigeria. Yet, these lawyers also work
within a larger profession that is conservative and, at times, demandingly
corrupt. Indeed, as will be discussed, the story of the Nigerian legal
profession has long been complicated. Dating back to 1960, the year Nigeria
gained its independence, lawyers aided and abetted—but also avoided,
navigated, and even challenged—the practice of corruption.14
Today, the story is equally cross-cutting. Consider a day in the life of a
twenty first-century Nigerian lawyer.15 In the morning, the lawyer might pay
a bribe to a government official to have a client’s needs met.16 That afternoon,
the lawyer might search for a police officer to testify in a case and who is
not requesting a bribe to do so.17 In the evening, the lawyer may organize a
march demanding the resignation of judges who are being investigated for
taking bribes to throw cases.18 Finally, late at night, the lawyer may accept a
payout from a politician who is hoping for the bar’s support on a
controversial legislative bill being proposed.19
and comprised a growing segment of the bar that is wanting to have the Nigerian legal profession engage
international lawyers on much more interactive terms, as described particularly in Section IV of this
paper.
14
See Jayanth K. Krishnan, Academic SAILERS: The Ford Foundation and the Efforts to Shape
Legal Education in Africa, 1957–1977, 52 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 261 (2012). Note the Nigerian Bar
Association, as this discussion will highlight, has a long pre-independence history. For example, the first
Nigerian lawyer to be called to the English Bar was Alexander Sapara Williams in 1879. He served as
the NBA Chair from 1900–1915. Krishnan & Ajagbe, supra note 12, at 229–230 (discussing the preindependence role of the NBA).
15
The account is based on repeated narratives conveyed to the author during his field research in
2017 and 2018. See supra note 13; discussion infra Section IV
16
Id. See also, Rafiu Ajakaye, Nigerian Court Convicts Top Lawyer in Corruption Trial, ANADOLU
AGENCY (Apr. 30, 2018), https://www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/nigerian-court-convicts-top-lawyer-incorruption-trial/1131924 (a recent, prominent corruption case).
17
See supra note 13; discussion infra Section IV. See also, Nigeria: Corruption Fueling Police
Abuses, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (Aug. 17, 2010), https://www.hrw.org/news/2010/08/17/nigeriacorruption-fueling-police-abuses.
18
See supra note 13; discussion infra Section IV. See also, Oladimeji Ramon, Trouble with Nigerian
Justice System—Lawyers, Judges, PUNCH (July 6, 2017), https://punchng.com/trouble-with-nigerianjustice-system-lawyers-judges/; Gbenro Adeoye, Nigerian Bar Association Leaders Know All Corrupt
Judges,
Lawyers
in
Nigeria—Falana,
SAHARA
REPORTERS
(Oct.
22,
2016),
http://saharareporters.com/2016/10/22/nigerian-bar-association-leaders-know-all-corrupt-judgeslawyers-nigeria-%E2%80%93falana; Samson Folarin, Falana Laments Corruption in Judiciary, Seeks
Reform, PUNCH (Apr. 17, 2019), https://punchng.com/falana-laments-corruption-in-judiciary-seeksreform/.
19
See discussion infra Section IV. See also, Rick Messick, The Lawyers’ Role in Perpetuating
Corruption
in
Nigeria,
Gʟᴏʙᴀʟ
Aɴᴛɪ-Cᴏʀʀᴜᴘᴛɪᴏɴ
Bʟᴏɢ
(Dec.
7,
2016),
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These types of practices in Nigeria are not uncommon. Most of the
approximately 100,000 lawyers in the country wear multiple hats and engage
in particular courses of action depending upon the circumstances in which
they find themselves.20 In certain situations, where the bribe resembles what
might be seen as petty “tollbooth corruption”—or the need to make an extra
(albeit nominal) payment to have a minor service completed—the lawyer, in
this case, is an enabler.21 Where lawyers are the bribe-receivers, they can be
viewed as affirmative participants in the culture of corruption. However,
where the lawyer’s reputation is at stake, or where there is a rule of law issue
in which the lawyer passionately believes, there may be hesitation or even
disruptive protest towards the corruptive practice. The main point here is that
Nigerian lawyers can be, and have been, at the forefront of promoting rule
of law reform, while also being impediments to it.22
The question then becomes whether the subset of lawyers—who are
locally situated but globally experienced and who publicly advocate for an
end to corruption at all levels of society—are able to hold firm to their
principles and make a difference. As the story below documents, this cohort
tends to share the following set of characteristics that connect them to the
global marketplace: (1) they have some type of foreign education or have
been exposed to best practices by their global legal counterparts; (2) they
practice high-end corporate law that requires them to work in multiple
foreign jurisdictions; (3) they are aggressive in advocating for foreign
investment in Nigeria; and (4) they see themselves as an “elite battalion”
who are determined to stamp-out corruption in order to raise Nigeria’s
international profile.
With their relative wealth and success, this elite cadre possesses
significant social and political capital. Yet, to what extent can they actually
disrupt the entrenched status quo? What strategies do they employ; what
constraints do they face? How have their efforts been received? And what
impact have they had on promoting a rule of law culture in Nigeria?
https://globalanticorruptionblog.com/2016/12/07/the-lawyers-role-in-perpetuating-corruption-innigeria/; Adeoye, supra note 18.
20
The number of lawyers in Nigeria cannot be confidently ascertained. During the author’s
fieldwork, he heard multiple figures being used—ranging from 60,000 to 120,000. Respected observers
believe that the number is likely around 100,000, although a report from less than a decade ago notes that
since 1962 not even 70,000 lawyers had been trained. See Since 1962, Law School Has Not Trained Up
to
70,000
Lawyers,
THE
NIGERIAN
VOICE
(June
17,
2000),
https://www.thenigerianvoice.com/news/27276/since-1962-law-school-has-not-trained-up-to-70-000lawyers.html. Furthermore, there is a question as to how many of the 100,000 actually practice. Figures
that were given by experts during the field research suggest only about 60%–70% are practitioners. See
supra note 13; discussion infra Section IV.
21
See Irina Slinko et al., Laws for Sale: Evidence from Russia, 7 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 284 (2005).
22
This is the thesis of the paper, which will be explored in the sections below.
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The answers to these questions are critical, because they help to unlock
an enduring puzzle as to which agents are best situated to lead a country out
of its mired, corrupt history and onto the global stage as a respected power.
For other nations, particularly in the Global South, that are also seeking to
strengthen their rule of law regimes, the lessons from this study are
instructive in determining whether lawyers who value and are part of global
networks are capable of curbing corruption within their own domestic
contexts.
*

*

*

This study will proceed in the following manner. Section I will place
the story of lawyers as enablers, navigators, and disrupters within a
theoretical framework that draws on three particular literatures. Namely,
there will be a review of the scholarship that has been done, respectively, on
corruption, “cause lawyering,” and what is known as elite theory. Section II
then provides an overview of the Nigerian legal profession as it stands today.
Subsequently, Section III focuses on a subset of Nigerian lawyers who
embody a relatively new cohort of professionals who are actively engaging
the global landscape. This segment of the bar has espoused transparency,
good governance, and the rule of law as the guiding principles that are
necessary to steer Nigeria away from its infamous legacy of corruption. The
discussion here specifically focuses on what this elite group has done to try
and change the direction of how both the legal profession and the country as
a whole operate. To conclude, Section IV, provides a brief normative
assessment of this development and what might be expected in the years
ahead.
I.
A.

THEORETICAL FRAMING OF THE STUDY

The Corruption Literature and a Cynical View of Lawyers

A vast amount of writings have detailed how corruption at the macro,
micro, and meso levels affects the state of a country’s well-being.23 In terms
23

See, e.g., Xizi Liu, A Literature Review on the Definition of Corruption and Factors Affecting the
Risk of Corruption, 4 OPEN J. SOC. SCI. 171, 173 (2016) (noting that “[t]he meso factors that influence
the risk of corruption mainly emphasize the influence of the internal system construction on corruption.”).
For a well-known, detailed literature review, see Arne Disch et al., Anti-Corruption Approaches: A
Literature
Review,
NORWEGIAN
AGENCY
FOR
DEVELOPMENT,
https://www.sida.se/contentassets/3f5c8afd51a6414d9f6c8f8425fb935b/anti-corruption-approaches-aliterature-review_3153.pdf (last visited Mar. 19, 2020). Of course, many major international donor
agencies have made the study of (and fight against) corruption as part of their central mission. See, e.g.,
Combating Corruption, THE WORLD BANK, http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/governance/brief/anti-
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of Nigeria itself, the country has been a focal point of scholars and other
observers who study corruption. Chatham House, a policy think-tank based
in London, released a report in 2017 showing how corruption contributed to
Nigeria losing over a half-a-trillion dollars between 1960 and 2014.24 Daniel
Jordan Smith’s powerful, and still highly relevant, study addresses how
corruption is part-and-parcel of everyday life in Nigeria.25 As Smith explains,
ordinary citizens actively and passively participate in corruption; but they
are painfully frustrated by it, yet are also resigned to its omnipresence.26
There are then the numerous studies that Daniel Agbiboa has produced on
the prevalence of corruption by state actors and their civil society
counterparts. He documents the dire effect corruption is having on Nigeria’s
security, economy, political structure, and overall culture.27 The list of works
on the harmful consequences of corruption in Nigeria is extensive.28
With respect to the role played by the legal profession, in particular, the
theory here is straightforward. In societies like Nigeria, which lack a strong
rule of law history, often it is the lawyers who have perpetuated this climate.29
Lawyers are the ones with the training, technical skill-set, and legal

corruption (last visited Mar. 13, 2020); Peeling back the many layers of corruption, IMF ANN. REP.
(2018), https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/ar/2018/eng/spotlight/reducing-corruption/ (last visited
Mar. 13, 2020). Transparency International, which has as its primary objective to provide a “voice to the
victims and witnesses of corruption . . . [and by] work[ing] together with governments, businesses and
citizens to stop the abuse of power, bribery and secret deals.” What is Transparency International,
TRANSPARENCY INT’L, https://www.transparency.org/about (last visited Mar. 13, 2020).
24
See Leena Koni Hoffmann & Raj Navanit Patel, Collective Action on Corruption in Nigeria: A
Social Norms Approach to Connecting Society and Institutions, CHATHAM HOUSE REP. iv (2017),
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/publications/research/2017-05-17-corruption-nigeriahoffmann-patel-final.pdf.
25
See DANIEL JORDAN SMITH, A CULTURE OF CORRUPTION EVERYDAY DECEPTION AND POPULAR
DISCONTENT IN NIGERIA 263 (2007).
26
Id.
27
See, e.g, Daniel E. Agbiboa, One Step Forward, Two Steps Back: The Political Culture of
Corruption and Cleanups in Nigeria, 8 CEU POL. SCI. J. 273 (2013); Daniel E. Agbiboa, Corruption and
Economic Crime in Nigeria, 22 AFR. SEC. REV. 47 (2013); Daniel E. Agbiboa, Serving the Few, Starving
the Many: How Corruption Underdevelops Nigeria and How There Is an Alternative Perspective to
Corruption Cleanups, 58 AFR. TODAY 111 (2012); Daniel E. Agbiboa, Between Corruption and
Development: The Political Economy of State Robbery in Nigeria, 108 J. BUS. ETHICS, 325 (2011).
28
In September of 2018, Professor Matthew Stephenson of the Harvard Law School posted a
detailed, 584-page bibliography on corruption and anti-corruption, with much of this literature featuring
Nigeria as part of the directory. See Matthew C. Stephenson, Bibliography on Corruption and
Anticorruption (Sept. 2018),
http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/mstephenson/2018PDFs/Stephenson%20Corruption%20Bibliograp
hy%20Sept%2012%202018.pdf.
29
See OKECHUKWU OKO, PROBLEMS AND CHALLENGES FOR LAWYERS IN AFRICA: LESSONS FROM
NIGERIA 217–51 (2007) [hereinafter Oko, PROBLEMS AND CHALLENGES]; Okechukwu Oko,
Consolidating Democracy on a Troubled Continent: A Challenge for Lawyers in Africa, 33 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 573 (2000) [hereinafter Oko, Consolidating Democracy].
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knowledge to put into place regulations, statutes, and even constitutions that
allow for themselves and those they represent to benefit at the expense of the
rest of the public.30 Lawyers are also the ones who manipulate and use their
fluency in legalese to obfuscate facts and to give legitimacy to practices that
pervert justice at the local, state, and national levels. In sum, according to
this perspective, lawyers in Nigeria have been pivotal figures who have
significantly contributed to instability and the lack of prolonged democracy
in the post-colonial period.31
B.

Relevant Cause Lawyering and Elite Theory Literatures

Whereas the above literature showcases lawyers in society working as
active participants in the corruption enterprise, scholarship from two other
areas takes a different approach, both of which have more normatively
positive assessments. Austin Sarat and the late Stuart Scheingold were
trailblazers within what has become known as the “cause lawyering”
literature.32 Sarat and Scheingold rejected how the legal profession was being
negatively portrayed. For them, lawyers were not homogenous; instead, they
were layered, diverse actors who had varied goals, interests, and motivations.
And within the bar, there was a salient group of cause lawyers who saw their
work as an embodiment of doing something more than representing clients
on discrete legal matters.33 For these professionals, achieving financial
success was an afterthought. Rather, their main ambition was to combat what
they viewed as corruptive influences on their environment. To achieve this
objective, they used their legal skills to promote morality, good governance,
and the rule of law.34
Of course, as part of their analysis, Sarat and Scheingold recognized
that within the cause lawyering cohort, there was diversity of thought.35 Such
lawyers could advocate on behalf of conservative, moderate, or liberal
causes, and part of their strategy was to meld law together with politics in

30

See supra note 29. For another study confirming this point regarding the judiciary, see Peter
Chukwuma Obutte, Corruption, Administration of Justice and the Judiciary in Nigeria, SSRN 1–2 (Feb.
3, 2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2727319.
31
See Oko, PROBLEMS AND CHALLENGES, supra note 29; Oko, Consolidating Democracy, supra
note 29; Obutte, supra note 30.
32
See supra note 2; AUSTIN SARAT & STUART SCHEINGOLD, CAUSE LAWYERING: POLITICAL
COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES (1998).
33
See supra note 32; see also MICHAEL W. MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK: PAY EQUITY REFORM AND
THE POLITICS OF LEGAL MOBILIZATION (1994).
34
See supra note 32. For a review of the cause-lawyering literature, see Jayanth K. Krishnan,
Lawyering for a Cause and Experiences from Abroad, 94 CAL. L. REV. 575 (2006).
35
See SCHEINGOLD AND SARAT 2004, supra note 2, at 2–9.
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order to pursue a specific end.36 Additionally, those with a cause lawyering
mentality routinely encountered challenges—whether it be during law
school,37 within the profession itself,38 within their employment settings,39 or
within the political arena.40 Yet, cause lawyers were united by a higher
calling: to stand up against the corrosive forces imperiling progress on
important political goals that had larger macro benefits for society writlarge.41
This vision of cause lawyers being able to effectuate change traces its
roots to another theoretical framework. “Elite theory” has long argued that
societies have within them sets of powerful individuals who play prominent
roles in determining the direction of governmental policies.42 While there can
be competition among different elite cohorts, along with the fact that elite
groups can rotate in terms of their positions of influence, the premise of this
theory is that those players who exert the strongest, most effective form of
force on state decision-makers will ultimately see their policy preferences
put into place.43 And lawyers can be one such elite bloc with this ability to
impose their will.
What this study aims to show, however, is that viewing lawyers only
through the elite theory lens is incomplete. Similarly, seeing them solely as
36

Id. See also Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold, Cause Lawyering and the Reproduction of
Professional Authority: An Introduction, in CAUSE LAWYERING (AUSTIN SARAT & STUART SCHEINGOLD
eds., 1998).
37
See SCHEINGOLD AND SARAT 2004, supra note 2, at 51–72.
38
Id. at 23–51.
39
Id. at 72–98. See also Stuart Scheingold & Anne Bloom, Transgressive Cause Lawyering: Practice
Sites and the Politicization of the Professional, 5 INT’L LEGAL PROF. 209 (1998).
40
See SCHEINGOLD & SARAT 2004, supra note 2, at 98–124. See also Krishnan, supra note 34, at
584–88.
41
See supra note 40.
42
A vast literature in the social sciences has discussed elite theory for decades. For a summary of
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Practice in Brazil: A Historical Study, 41 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 346, 348–49 (2016) (citing FLOYD HUNTER,
COMMUNITY POWER STRUCTURE: A STUDY OF DECISION MAKERS (1953); ELMER E.
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For a discussion of this point, see ROBERT MICHELS, POLITICAL PARTIES: A SOCIOLOGICAL
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SOCIOLOGY (1963); C.R. Kaltwasser, Toward Post-Neo Liberalism in Latin America, 46 LATIN AM. RES.
REV. 225 (2011). For two contemporary scholars who have written about how elites can bring to the table
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valiant cause lawyering champions also is insufficient, as is cynically
categorizing them as exclusive agents of corruption. Rather, a more nuanced
approach is required. The Nigerian case study provides an opportunity to
highlight how lawyers can simultaneously engage in facilitating, navigating,
and denouncing corruption as part of everyday business. Each of these ways
of operating as a lawyer is what makes understanding the country’s legal
profession complicated—but also realistic.
II.

AN OVERVIEW OF THE NIGERIAN BAR

A. Support for the Cynical Theory on Nigerian Lawyers
As the most populated country in Africa, with approximately 200
million people, Nigeria is nevertheless extremely underpopulated when it
comes to lawyers. Moreover, the distribution of where these lawyers are
located is uneven. There are 36 states in Nigeria, with the vast majority
working within the country’s major metropolitan cities: Lagos, Kano,
Ibadan, Abuja, Port Harcourt, and Benin City.44 Yet, nearly two-thirds of the
country’s populace resides in rural areas,45 where the presence of lawyers is
sparse, if not non-existent.46 Furthermore, most lawyers in Nigeria (upwards
of 90%) work as solo-practicing litigators, regardless of whether they are in
rural or urban Nigeria. According to a high-ranking official of the Nigeria
Bar Association (NBA), most lawyers “remain poor,”47 earning on average
only about the equivalent of $150 (USD) per month well below the per capita
GDP of the country, which is approximately $5,300 (USD) annually.48
Given this economic situation, it is not surprising that many Nigerian
lawyers fall prey to enticements of corruption at the individual, micro level.
At the more macro level, it is also not difficult to see how the bar, in its
institutional capacity, would be susceptible. The birth of the NBA dates back
to colonial times, with the passage of the 1933 British-backed Legal
Practitioners Ordinance.49 As the British had done in managing many of its
44
The demographics of where the largest number of lawyers are situated comes from author
interviews with three bar association officials, in Abuja, Nigeria (June 30, 2018).
45
See Holly E. Reed and Blessing U. Mberu, Capitalizing on Nigeria’s Demographic Dividend:
Reaping the Benefits and Diminishing the Burdens, 27 AFR. POPULATION STUD. 319, 321 (2013) (citing
a study from the Nigerian Population Commission and ICF Macro).
46
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47
See Kunle Awosiyan, Why Many Nigerian Lawyers Are Poor, SILVER BIRD TV,
http://silverbirdtv.com/uncategorized/34794/why-many-nigerian-lawyers-are-poor/ (last visited Mar. 11,
2020) (citing the then chairman of the NBA’s Lagos Branch Law Week Committee, Ahmed Akbani, who
was making the point that because Nigerian lawyers are not business savvy, they struggle financially).
48
See Nigeria GDP Per Capita PPP, TRADING ECON., https://tradingeconomics.com/nigeria/gdpper-capita-ppp (last visited Mar. 10, 2020).
49
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colonies around the world, it used a formula that it saw as essential to retain
power. Namely, it would grant accommodations to certain interests and then
move to co-opt those who had received such Royal benefits, in order to breed
loyalty and keep the local population from unifying against the Crown.50 In
terms of the NBA, the British legalized and legitimized this organization—
many of whose members were educated and trained in the United Kingdom
(U.K.)—as a means of establishing a strong local ally.51 In fact, as one current
member of the NBA remarked, lawyers in the colonial era were perceived to
be in the “hip pocket”52 of the British and were skeptically viewed by the
general public.
In the post-colonial period, this perception of the NBA being involved
in various nefarious activities has continued. There are specific examples
highlighting how the NBA helped the different military regimes maintain
their power. For instance, during the brutal reign of General Sani Abacha
(1993–1998), the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) was
established.53 This agency today has gained respect and legitimacy, but at the
time it was created, it was viewed by many grassroots activists as a farcical
effort by the government to appear as if it was concerned with human rights.
Yet, many within the NBA supported this Abacha-initiative in the 1990s.54
For skeptics, this endorsement had all the trappings of an interest group that
was looking to curry favor with the ruling elite for the purposes of gaining
benefits at the rest of the public’s expense.
Another instance during the Abacha regime that caused observers to
question the integrity and moral standing of NBA-lawyers involved the
prosecution of the famed environmental advocate, Ken Saro-Wiwa,
beginning in 1994. Saro-Wiwa had been a fierce defender of the Ogoni
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people who resided in the Niger Delta region.55 He and his allies had claimed
that the Nigerian government and the Shell Corporation, which had a
dominating presence in the area, had exploited the Delta’s resources and
engaged in systematic discrimination and displacement of the Ogoni.56 The
arrest, trial, conviction, and eventual execution of Saro-Wiwa and eight of
his colleagues resulted in global condemnation and has been written at length
elsewhere.57 For our purposes, it was appalling that a group of private
lawyers from the NBA agreed to assist the Abacha government in the
prosecution of Saro-Wiwa and his fellow defendants.58 That professionals
who were supposed to be defenders of the rule of law were intentionally
subverting it, smacked of craven instrumentalism and corruption.
Others too have been critical of the bar during this and other periods.59
Okechukwu Oko is one of the most well-known legal scholars on Nigeria
who has described how lawyers have misused their positions,60 whether it be
through procuring questionable pecuniary benefits, failing to uphold their
professional responsibilities, or more generally, thinking about themselves
over the greater societal good.61 In fact, even the manner in which Nigerian
lawyers have been educated and trained has been deeply problematic, as
corrupt practices are often encouraged within many of these academic
institutions.62 Oko has long contended that in order for Nigeria’s democratic
experiment to be consolidated, the country needs to have a legal profession
that is stable, predictable, and legitimate—and one that is publicly perceived
to have these characteristics as well.63
55
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Then there is the noted human rights activist, Femi Falana, who has
chastised the NBA for brazenly participating in corruption.64 For example, in
2016, the government’s Economic and Financial Crimes Commission found
that certain senior lawyers had been complicit in cases of money laundering
for years.65 And in 2017, a federal court voided the election win of the current
president of the NBA, A.B. Mahmoud.66 The court ruled that the NBA
constitution, upon which Mahmoud’s victory was premised, had been
amended in an improper fashion to give him an unfair advantage.67
Perhaps the harshest criticism, however, has come from a confidential
report on the “secretariat” of the NBA, which was leaked to the press in
2013.68 The secretariat is the bureaucratic arm of the NBA that originally
handled only “minor administrative and logistical issues . . . [whereas today
it oversees] programming responsibilities, requiring the full attention of a
professional cadre . . . .” 69 In 2012, the president of the NBA constituted an
external committee to review the secretariat, which had developed the
reputation for lethargy and incompetence.70 Chaired by Chidi Odinkalu,71 the
committee’s final report not only confirmed these negative images, but it
also offered another damning conclusion. It found “a clear pattern of credibly
64
See Femi Falana Blasts Nigerian Bar Association, EASTWIND NEWSPAPER (Oct. 10, 2016),
https://eastwindnewz.wordpress.com/2016/10/10/femi-falana-blasts-nigeria-bar-association/; Omatayo
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65
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(Sept.
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https://www.facebook.com/aminugamawa/posts/1112314568852875:0. See also Matthew Page, A New
Taxonomy for Corruption in Nigeria, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT’L PEACE (July 17, 2018),
https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/07/17/new-taxonomy-for-corruption-in-nigeria-pub-76811; John
Campbell, Nigeria Sees More High Level Corruption Convictions under Buhari, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN
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attested allegations of work-place bullying, abuse and sexual harassment,
intimidation and exploitation, with no mechanisms of workplace
recourse”72—all undergirded by a dominant, pervasive culture of corruption.
The above discussion thus supports the theory that powerful segments
of the Nigerian bar have not been shy to help facilitate corruptive practices
during both the military and post-military eras.73 As the research has shown,
many lawyers, over the years, have engaged in or been the beneficiaries of
corruption.74 And this behavior has led to a serious undermining of the rule
of law.
B.

Support for the Theory of Nigerian Lawyers as Cause Lawyering
Elites

An alternative narrative to the one just discussed—with supportive
counter-evidence—is that the Nigerian bar has been on the right side of the
thorny legal, political, and moral issues confronting the country in the postcolonial era. Consider the above-mentioned Saro-Wiwa case. While it was
true that a team of NBA lawyers served as prosecutors on behalf of the
government, there was also a highly reputed team of NBA-defense lawyers
across the aisle. These lawyers worked pro bono and joined forces with civil
society organizations in mounting a strong defense for Saro-Wiwa and his
colleagues.75
As part of their work, the defense lawyers had to operate within the
predetermined, corrupt Abacha-Tribunals, but they navigated these forums
thoughtfully and vigorously, and they even had the courage to boycott the
proceedings (upon Saro-Wiwa’s urging and in defiance of the government’s
orders), after ultimately concluding that there was no point in participating
in such a sham process.76 However, while they were engaged in the trial, the
defense team brought worldwide attention to their case and even took the
matter to the continent’s African Commission on Human and People’s
Rights, which ruled in their favor.77 (Not surprisingly, General Abacha
72
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ignored the Commission’s judgment, even though Nigeria was a signatory
to the convention that brought the Commission into existence. 78) After the
case ended and Saro-Wiwa and his colleagues were executed, these lawyers
continued to press for justice. Working with a group of American lawyers,
in 2009 they were able to reach a settlement with the Shell Corporation, in
which the latter agreed to pay over $15 million to Saro-Wiwa’s family and
the other defendants for what they had endured under Abacha’s reign of
terror.79
There are also other examples of Nigerian lawyers showing this type of
commitment to the rule of law and to causes greater than themselves. To
begin, it was the NBA “that admirably served as a vital piece of the struggle
for independence,”80 which eventually occurred in 1960. Then, the 1963
Constitution of Nigeria, which was seen as a hallmark of rights protection,
federalism, separation of powers, and good governance, was drafted by
leading lawyers of the NBA. Even though this document remained in place
for just three years (because of a military coup that occurred in 1966), it has
remained the reference point to which lawyers in Nigeria have turned as they
have drafted subsequent constitutions.81
Also, during the first period of military rule (1966–1979), civil society
organizations, working together with lawyers from the NBA, successfully
lobbied the regime to pass the Legal Aid Act of 1976, which established the
Legal Aid Council (LAC).82 The purpose of the statute and the Council was
to ensure that indigent criminal defendants received legal assistance from the
state, and it was the NBA that served as the main group that represented these
individuals. To be sure, it was often difficult to find lawyers willing to work
for a poorly funded government agency that always had the military

78

See Krishnan & Ajagbe, supra note 12, at 216; French, supra note 76.
See Mouawad, supra note 56.
80
See Oko, Consolidating Democracy, supra note 29, at 635–36.
81
See Krishnan & Ajagbe, supra note 12, at 203; Ayoyinka Jegede, Nigeria Has to Adopt the 1963
Constitution, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 22, 2016), https://guardian.ng/features/nigeria-has-to-adopt-1963constitution/. Note, as a prominent member of the Nigerian legal profession stated, however, it is
important to remember that the “1979 Constitution which was drafted under the chairmanship of Nigeria’s
greatest lawyer, Chief Rotimi Williams, SAN . . . [also] remains the reference and inspiration for all
subsequent iterations. As a matter of fact, the extant 1999 Constitution is, in the main, a verbatim
replication of that of 1979.” Author correspondence with respondent (July 28, 2019).
82
See Krishnan & Ajagbe, supra note 12, at 206 (citing Ojama Akor, Developing Legal Aid
Strategies
for
Poor
Nigerians,
PRESSREADER.COM
(Aug.
19,
2004),
https://www.pressreader.com/nigeria/daily-trust/20140819/282325383136021). For more on the history
of LAC, see Historical Profile of the Legal Aid Council of Nigeria, LEGAL AID COUNCIL (May 22, 2017),
http://www.legalaidcouncil.gov.ng/index.php/about-us/profile; PENAL REFORM INTERNATIONAL AND
BLUHM LEGAL CLINIC OF NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW, ACCESS-TO-JUSTICE IN
AFRICA AND BEYOND: MAKING THE RULE OF LAW A REALITY 117 (2007).
79

109

NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF HUMAN RIGHTS

overseeing how it functioned.83 Yet, the program had success stories, as the
efforts of the NBA did reap benefits for some especially needy defendants.84
The country’s second period of military rule (1983–1999) also saw
careful lawyering by elite professionals who navigated the tumultuous
political waters in order to meet the challenges of the times. For example,
the well-regarded Civil Liberties Organization (CLO) was established in
1987. It, together with a set of NBA-lawyers, strategically worked to
convince the ruling military regime into “updat[ing] the 1976 Legal Aid
Act.”85 Additionally, during this time, a CLO-led coalition of grassroots
lawyers successfully litigated several other high profile matters in front of
the African Commission.86 And other organizations had NBA lawyers within
them who worked quietly and tactically with international institutions in
order to procure funding so that they could continue their work championing
the different constituencies who were suffering under the military.87
As Nigeria moved towards civilian, democratic rule beginning in 1999,
lawyers were once again at the forefront of this transition. The drafting of
the new constitution that was enacted in May of that year involved a team of
lawyers and was led by Justice Niki Tobi, who was then a judge on the
Nigerian Court of Appeal.88 Justice Tobi headed the Constitution Debate
83
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Coordinating Committee (CDCC) that worked with a group of Senior
Advocates of Nigeria—or SANs—on this new constitution.89 Since 1975,
SANs have held the position of what is the equivalent of a Queen’s Council
in the U.K., and it is the highest rank one can attain among lawyers in
Nigeria.90
In the post-1999 era, members of the legal profession, working with
rights-based civil society groups, have also engaged the courts through
public interest litigation campaigns.91 In addition, lawyers have been
involved in pushing for, and then being a part of, government-established
truth commissions to investigate the widespread human rights abuses that
occurred during the military years.92 They have played a prominent role in
fighting various forms of corruption in government and within the private
sector as well. 93 And leaders of the NBA have called for legal education
institutions to inculcate the values of good governance, transparency, and
anti-corruption practices into the curriculum of all students who study law
today.94
Clearly, this alternative story about the role of lawyers in a country like
Nigeria paints a far different picture than the one offered by the more cynical
perspective. Under this cause lawyering/elite model approach, most lawyers
in Nigeria have been positive figures who have navigated the corrupt
environment in which they reside, in order to try and bring about change for
the better. This then leads us to ask: which narrative is correct? Which
version is most accurate?
The answer is that there is truth in what each of these theories purports.
The Nigerian Bar is not a homogenous organization. Segments of it have
indeed engaged in corrupt practices over the years; others have been ardent
rule of law advocates seeking to strengthen and consolidate the country’s
democratic experiment; and then there have certainly been those who have
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acted in both positive and negative ways—thereby highlighting the overall
fluidity of the work-environment within the country.95
What is noteworthy, however, is that in the early 2000s a new legal
organization emerged that sought to embrace anti-corruption values not just
on a macro, public law scale, but on a more day-to-day, private law level as
well. This group has proven to be a significant legal, economic, and political
force within the country. Its evolution, contributions, and the manner in
which it is seeking to combat corruption within Nigeria are discussed next.
III.

THE RISE OF A NEW LEGAL CONTINGENT
A.

Background

The Section on Business Law (SBL), a subset of the NBA, was founded
by a group of Nigerian business lawyers in late 2004 in the city of Lagos, the
country’s economic (and former national) capital.96 With an estimated 20
million people residing today in this mega-metropolis, Lagos is the
commercial hub of Nigeria, as well as for much of the African continent.
Given this context, it is not surprising that most of Nigeria’s major financial
matters have occurred within Lagos as well.
The cohort of business lawyers who came together to form the SBL had
a clear objective in mind. Given that Nigeria’s transition from military to
civilian rule had occurred just a few years prior, the country’s political
leaders were trying to market Nigeria as Africa’s newest, largest democracy,
where foreign investors: a) would be welcome; b) could be confident that
their money would be safe; and c) would not need to worry about corruption
hampering their ability to do business.97 The group of lawyers who created
the SBL saw this moment as an opportunity to advocate for a set of ideals
that they believed would benefit them economically, but more importantly,
would benefit the nation as a whole.98
Consider the early years of the SBL and the manner in which it came
into existence. The election of 1999 brought back to power Olusegun
Obasanjo (who was a military ruler between 1976 and 1979) as president.
This election was not perfect, but it was overall a success compared to what
the country had experienced dating back to 1960.99 In the immediate
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aftermath, one of Nigeria’s most well-known business lawyers, George
Etomi, started working with a group of colleagues from Lagos in hopes of
discussing ways to mobilize the commercial legal community.100
In terms of his own background, Etomi had earned his LL.B. in 1976
from the University of Ife and became a member of the bar a year later—
during a period of military rule.101 Subsequently, he traveled to the U.K.
where he earned his Master’s Degree in law from the London School of
Economics in 1979.102 Upon his return to Nigeria, the country had
transitioned to democratic rule, and he was eager to be a part of this new
era.103 Unfortunately, by 1983 the military once again took over and stayed
in power for the next 16 years.104 Etomi was thus a young corporate lawyer
who had witnessed a country that went from military rule to democracy and
then back to military rule in a span of less than ten years.
Throughout this entire period, however, Etomi strongly believed that
the NBA had not paid enough heed to private law lawyers.105 In 2000, after
democratic constitutionalism was restored, Etomi approached the newly
elected president of the NBA, Senior Advocate of Nigeria (SAN) Chief
O.C.J. Okocho, making the case that the bar association needed to take into
account business law practitioners.106 Okocho agreed. Etomi was appointed
as chair of a commission to examine how best to give voice to business
practitioners as well as to arrive at a procedure for “amending the NBA
constitution to allow for the creation of” a business law section.107 In 2002,
Chief Wole Olanikpekun (SAN) became president of the NBA, and he
continued to encourage Etomi to proceed. Thereafter, Etomi and a group of
his colleagues worked to craft substantive ways to shift Nigeria’s global
image from one that was seen as a corrupt banana republic to a society that
could be viewed as economically efficient and democratically reliable.108
100
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Eventually, by December of 2004, Etomi and his colleagues received
permission from the NBA to establish the SBL. Going forward, the SBL
would be the division of the bar in charge of “engender[ing] the professional
development of Nigerian commercial lawyers and thereby rais[ing] the level
of business law practice in Nigeria.”109 In addition, the constitution of the
NBA was amended to include provisions that now recognized and valued the
importance of transactional business lawyers. It is interesting that these
provisions did not come into being until 2004, considering that for many
years (including periods of military control) there were already many
corporate law firms working on transactional matters in Lagos. By relying
on multiple methods of data collection (because no one comprehensive
directory existed), we were able to create a detailed listing of the firms that
were in existence during those early years—see Appendix A.110
As that table shows, the size of law firms in Nigeria has never been
large, at least in global, comparative terms. Most have not had more than five
to ten lawyers, and even today the largest firms have just around one hundred
lawyers. Nevertheless, the fact that these lawyers, who had been working on
private law matters within the country, now were in a position to be liaisons
for international investors gave them a type of leverage that they did not
previously have. Accordingly, the SBL came to be seen by the upper
echelons of the NBA as necessary for the economic development of the
country. The request by Etomi and his colleagues that the bar listen to their
philosophy and plans for moving the country forward was now receiving
more deference than ever before.111
B.

The Philosophy in the Early Years

Underlying the establishment of the SBL was the philosophy that
modern Nigeria had to be part of the globalized world; thus Nigeria needed
a sophisticated business law sector where international investors felt secure
in order to compete in the global market.112 Normatively too, the SBL
founders believed that globalization was good for the legal system and for
the country as well.113 Like Etomi, the other early leaders had global
109
See Nigerian Bar Association Section on Business Law, (NBA SBL), LINKEDIN,
https://www.linkedin.com/company/nba-sbl/about/ (last visited Mar. 11 2020).
110
The table is provided after the concluding section of this study. The methodology for compiling
the table is discussed as well.
111
See Etomi, supra note 96.
112
See generally Nigerian Bar Association book, supra note 100. Also, note, this point was made by
several lawyers during interviews in 2017 and 2018. See, e.g., interview with three separate lawyers, in
Abuja, Nigeria (June 27, 2018); Interview with four leading SBLA Lawyers, in Lagos, Nigeria (June 19,
2017).
113
See supra note 112.

114

18:93 (2020)

International Lawyers as Disrupters of Corruption: Nigeria

experiences. They had studied abroad, had clients from overseas, worked
with lawyers across multiple jurisdictions, and routinely traveled to Asia,
Europe, and North America.114 They were also members of various
international legal organizations and were frequent attendees or speakers at
conferences in different countries.115
These lawyers’ first priority was engaging their counterparts working
in other markets. Foreign bar associations were promoting best global legal
practices at annual meetings and during continuing legal education
seminars.116 If the Nigerian corporate bar wanted to “keep-up,” then its
constituents had to travel abroad to learn these skills.117 Hence, these lawyers
saw themselves as quintessential international actors who could use the
lessons learned from overseas to help the new Nigeria find its place in this
evolving global market.
The first order of business the SBL leaders felt they had to tackle was
how to combat both the reality and the image that Nigeria was defined by
corruption. While the former was a systemic issue requiring a long-term
commitment by the state and civil society to correct; in terms of the latter,
the SBL believed it could have a more immediate impact. Dating back to the
late 1990s, the German-based Transparency International organization had
been conducting what it called “perception”118 surveys, in order to gauge how
business and other civic leaders perceived corruption around the world.
Since 1995, Nigeria consistently ranked at or near the very bottom.119 Given
that SBL-lawyers were critical players who interacted with such
international business leaders, they felt they could directly help shape a new
and positive narrative on investing in Nigeria.
To that end, there were specific steps that the SBL pursued starting in
2005, the first official year of its operation. For example, it launched an
“Anti-Corruption [and] Money Laundering”120 initiative. The “hope . . . [was]
that, through the forum of the SBL, lawyers and policy makers [from the
government] would engage with each other to find ways to cooperate in the
fight against corruption.”121 In particular, the SBL was interested in
114
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reforming the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC).122 The
EFCC was established in 2003, upon the directive of President Obasanjo,
after a leading international organization (the French-based, Financial
Action Task Force) found that Nigeria had been woefully failing in its efforts
to fight corruption.123 The specific mission of the EFCC was to pursue and
prosecute those who engaged in money laundering.124
The SBL had complained about the practices of the EFCC because the
agency routinely had condemned defense lawyers for being complicit in their
clients’ misdeeds.125 For example, the first Chair of the EFCC, Mallam Nuhu
Ribadu, would frequently decry the fact that fees that defense lawyers would
receive from their clients were from laundered money. For the SBL, this
position was both unfair and unsupported. As one SBL official noted, in a
rule of law society even the most vilified defendant deserved to have a lawyer
zealously advocate on that individual’s behalf.126 Moreover, having a
contrary system in place would understandably scare-off foreign investors
from coming to Nigeria, especially if they believed that, were they to be
investigated or arrested, their lawyers too could potentially be accused.127
Therefore, in 2005, the SBL began holding high level meetings with
members of the EFCC so as to “provide an avenue for both parties to put
aside any differences in orientation or practice and learn from each other.”128
Concurrently, the SBL also began working with the Ministry of Commerce’s
new office referred to as the Special Control Unit against Money Laundering
(SCUML).129 This division was charged with monitoring and investigating
the economic activities of civil society organizations, which theoretically
included the bar as well.130 (As discussed above, because some members of
the NBA in the past had sullied the bar’s reputation, it was not completely
surprising that the SCUML might wish to assert oversight powers over the
organization if need be.) As a way of ensuring that they could be involved in
how the agency would carry out its mandate, and as a signal that they were
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on its side in wanting to stamp-out corruption, SBL leaders took an
affirmative role in working with the SCUML.131
In 2006, the SBL hosted its first major conference, which brought
together policymakers from the SCUML and EFCC, the business bar, leaders
of the NBA, and a small group of private international observers. The theme
was “Globalization and Legal Practice—The WTO Initiative: The
Implication for the Future of Legal Practice in Nigeria.”132 A significant part
of this event focused on how Nigerian lawyers needed to equip themselves
with best practices to compete within the international trade space. More will
be discussed on this point shortly; however, an underlying focus throughout
the conference was “[t]he War against Corruption and Its Impact on
Reforms.”133 Different panels on anti-corruption and money laundering were
held, along with numerous sideline meetings between the various
stakeholders.
For the SBL, this inaugural conference was an enormous milestone. For
the first time since independence, there was this type of professional
gathering totaling some 600 attendees.134 The country’s top business lawyers
were interacting and seeking to influence—in a thoughtful, academic
manner—state leaders who were going to frame regulatory policy for the
next decade.135 This was also an opportunity for the SBL to distinguish itself
from the larger NBA. Since Etomi and his colleagues had started mobilizing
in the early 2000s, a chasm had developed between them and the NBAleadership.136 The former wanted to set themselves apart; they did not want
to be tied to what they saw as the more questionable elements within the
larger Association.137
Moreover, the SBL-leadership wanted to develop a new culture within
its own cohort. Several members of the conference’s inaugural planning
committee noted that they saw the education of the Nigerian business bar as
a priority, particularly in this era of globalization.138 One specific aspect
included teaching these lawyers about the ills of corruption. Therefore, the
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pitch the SBL leaders made was two-fold. First, the facilitation and practice
of corruption contributed to the continued image that Nigeria was a lawless
society, one in which foreign investors would stay clear.139 Second, it was
critical for Nigerian corporate lawyers to be familiar with the major anticorruption statute that global transactional lawyers were expected to know:
the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977.140 This statute prohibited
U.S. citizens and their representatives from engaging in acts such as bribery
and other forms of corruption in a foreign jurisdiction.141 The SBL believed
its members needed to be fully aware of this statute and its implications, not
just to protect its clients’ interests, but also to safeguard its own practices and
potentially its ability to work in the U.S.142 The inaugural conference, hence,
was the ideal setting to emphasize these anti-corruption measures.
C.

The End of the Etomi Era

The above discussion highlighted the key activities that Etomi
supervised during the initial years. But once the inaugural conference
successfully concluded, he and the rest of the SBL-leadership began thinking
about their longer-term strategy. They developed a multi-year plan that
would take them through the end of the decade and that prioritized:
•
•
•
•
•
•

relationships with other civil society groups;
collaborations with governmental units;
educational initiatives for law students, practitioners, and
judges;
global outreach to bar associations, foreign clients, and foreign
investors;
infrastructure; and
economic development.143

Each of these points were emphasized in different ways between 2007 and
2010 by having the SBL form sub-committees that were in charge of specific
issues. For example, the SBL Committee on Arbitration forged a working
partnership with Nigeria’s Chartered Institute of Arbitrators as well as with
an organization known as the Negotiation and Conflict Management
139
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Group.144 Other SBL sub-committees respectively collaborated with the
Nigerian Institute of Advanced Legal Studies (to work on corporate
governance matters), the Washington D.C.-based International Law Institute
(to study public procurement processes), and the Ministry of National
Planning (to strengthen antitrust measures in order “to underscore the
importance of competition.”).145 Two additional collaborations were
noteworthy. One was a joint partnership with the Ministry of Information
and Culture and private sector tourism groups to help showcase the
attractiveness of Nigeria to travelers. The other was a partnership with
domestic and international intellectual property lawyers to convey a message
to the global community that Nigeria was keen to protect the IP rights of
investors, creators, and entrepreneurs.146
Underpinning all of these activities by the SBL was the central principle
that Nigeria could only thrive if it shed the shackles of corruption that
burdened every aspect of life within the country. The rule of law needed to
be seen as sacred, and the SBL was committed to using its new-found social
capital and solid reputation to tirelessly promote this mantra. These values
were demonstrated well in the context of how the corporate bar interacted
with their foreign counterparts at the WTO, which was viewed by Nigerian
business lawyers as a respected and necessary institution. As mentioned
earlier, ensuring that Nigerian lawyers were familiar with the best practices
of the WTO was of paramount importance during the inaugural conference.
The organizers scheduled several “hot topic”147 panels on professionalism
and the functioning of the WTO, which brought together experts from “the
private and public sector, including representatives of multinational
companies, private law firms, the Federal Ministry of Justice and the Federal
Ministry of Commerce.”148
This emphasis on the WTO continued during the SBL’s 2007 and 2008
conferences.149 In fact, at the 2008 meeting three events occurred. First, a
delegation from the Pan-African Lawyers Union attended. These
representatives who came from around the continent requested that the NBA,
and specifically leaders from the SBL, serve as “the mouthpiece of Africa at
144
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various international fora” on trade.150 Second, the Attorney General of
Nigeria agreed to have the SBL participate in the next round of Doha
discussions, which involved the international community’s efforts to
negotiate a global deal on trade and tariffs.151 And third, a detailed
educational plan was formalized to train domestic lawyers to work on trade
matters in foreign jurisdictions.152
For George Etomi, these developments were significant steps in the
evolution of the Nigerian corporate bar.153 However, he still believed that the
only real way to permanently raise the international reputation of the legal
profession would be for Nigeria to improve its overall image on the rule of
law front.154 As such, the last two years of his leadership (2008–2010)
focused on assisting the government on a number of anti-corruption
measures.155 For example, the SBL advised policymakers on the best ways to
enforce Nigeria’s Money Laundering Act.156 The government and the SBL
also were involved in a campaign to encourage and de-stigmatize the practice
of whistle-blowing.157 If people who witnessed corruption worried about
being punished for reporting bad behavior, then the culture of corruption
would only continue.158
There was also a push to eliminate the prevalence of corruption in the
country’s infrastructure sector.159 Nigeria’s roads, airports, and harbors all
needed renovations.160 During the military years, the public-private
partnerships to improve these areas were riddled with corrupt practices.161
The SBL-leadership, under Etomi, argued that government officials, the
business community, and especially lawyers had to understand that clean
practices in the infrastructure space would be a major step forward in
attracting foreign investors to come to Nigeria.162
As 2008 ended, however, Nigeria had to grapple with a cataclysmic
event that affected much of the international community. The global
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financial crisis did not leave Nigeria unscathed. The Great Recession placed
the country’s real estate and stock markets in turmoil and its banking and
business law sectors in disarray. During 2009 and 2010, Etomi had the SBL’s
annual meetings focus on how to help Nigeria recover. He and his leadership
team assembled several working groups, panels, and seminars dedicated to
ensuring that the Nigerian bar could be in the best position to advise
interested parties on how to move forward.163
Interestingly, within these conversations, there was a lingering
sentiment that Nigeria’s difficulty in coping with the reverberating effects of
the crisis was related to the milieu of corruption that had permeated the
country for generations.164 At the same time, though, the SBL saw this
moment as an opportunity, one which the rule of law could be championed
as a remedy for not only resurrecting the economy but also for attracting
foreign investment and consolidating the country’s latest democratic
experiment. To that end, the SBL’s conferences in 2009 and 2010
emphasized establishing respected and timely dispute resolution processes—
such as arbitration—that could be employed and relied upon by parties. In
addition, advocating for improving the technology sector was hugely
promoted.165 As the SBL-leadership argued, Nigeria wanted to be a global
player. The only way to do so was to create a world-class technological
infrastructure that would provide assurances to foreign investors that the
country was serious about its intentions.166 And in order for modernization,
democratization, and the formalization of a rule of law regime to occur, the
first order of business was to eliminate the omnipresence of corruption.
George Etomi stepped down as chair of the SBL in 2010.167 In the
immediate aftermath, turmoil ensued due to tension that had been brewing
between the broader NBA and the SBL.168 The former had increasingly
become more skeptical of the latter’s focus on corporate and transactional
law, as well as what it perceived to be an elitist attitude by the SBL towards
the rest of the bar.169 In 2011, Etomi and his allies supported Mrs. Mfon
Usoro to become the next chair.170 She served only six months before being
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deposed by the NBA’s leaders. (The reasons for her dismissal vary
depending on who one asks. 171)
Thereafter, a well-known Senior Advocate of Nigeria, Charles
Adeyemi Candide-Johnson, was named SBL-chair.172 Johnson was
supported by the NBA, and largely for that reason the SBL refused to accept
him as its leader. By 2012, he was replaced by Gbenga Oyebode, who,
because of his stellar reputation as a commercial lawyer, was seen as a
consensus selection. Oyebode served his full two-year term (2012–2014) and
was then followed by Asue Ighodalo (2014–2016), Olu Akpata (2016–2018),
and Seni Adio, who is the current chair of the SBL.173
Today, the SBL continues to grow and build upon the ideas that were
developed by Etomi and his colleagues in the early 2000s. Membership
within the organization has risen to over 2,000 lawyers, and the signature
annual conferences are now massive events that draw attendees from
Nigeria’s major metropolitan cities, across Africa, and from Asia, Europe,
and North America.174 Like with any group, however, there remain
challenges that the SBL faces, including the Sisyphean task of figuring out
how to eradicate the culture of corruption that still envelopes Nigerian
society. The concluding section addresses these points next.
IV.

CONCLUSION

As the narrative above has revealed, there were multiple motivations
for creating the SBL. Ensuring that the Nigerian corporate bar had its
interests represented in government was, of course, a driving factor. But
there were other reasons as well. The SBL wanted to educate and equip its
members with the best practices from around the world so that they could be
sophisticated, competitive global lawyers. There was also a keen desire to
attract foreign investment. Establishing a cosmopolitan corporate lawyers’
association would be a signal to overseas investors that the Nigerian business
171
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law sector could indeed provide necessary legal services. And perhaps most
fundamentally, the SBL wanted to show the world that Nigeria could be a
society where the rule of law was valued, clean governance was taken
seriously, and consolidating a democratic system of government was a
priority.
For there to be a complete accounting of this story, however, there also
needs to be a discussion of the challenges currently confronting the SBL. To
begin, questions have emerged as to whether the SBL is concerned about the
interests of lawyers outside of its niche. As already described, the vast
majority of lawyers in the country engage in work that is far afield from what
the corporate bar does. This fact has led many within the larger NBA to
suggest that the SBL is too urban and too elitist.175 Furthermore, these NBA
members have also asked whether the corporate bar now is too
disproportionately powerful in terms of the influence it wields within
government and civil society.176 They wonder whether it is time for the NBA
to intervene and reign-in the SBL.177 For their part, SBL-leaders have
recognized that this sentiment exists. While they reject the manner in which
this issue has been framed, they concede that there must be a closing of this
perception gap, if the group wishes to continue to be an effective voice for
change within the country.178
Another issue that has been of concern for those both within and outside
of the SBL relates to gender. Since its founding, the SBL has only had one
woman as its chair, Mfon Usoro. While an increasing number of women have
played leadership roles within the organization, since Mrs. Usoro’s ouster in
2011, the subsequent chairs have all been men.179 At the annual 2018
conference, this concern about the lack of women in prominent posts once
again emerged, which caused several of the group’s leaders to take note and
to promise to address the matter in a more substantive fashion going
forward.180
For those who have argued for more inclusiveness of women in the
strategic operations of the SBL, this issue is pressing. The demographics of
the Nigerian legal profession are rapidly changing. Consider the structure of
legal educational institutions within the country alone. Today, there are
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approximately fifty universities that award a first degree in law.181 As in most
other parts of the world, law in Nigeria is studied at the undergraduate level.
Upon completion of the degree, graduates who wish to practice law are
required to enroll in what is called the Nigerian Law School (NLS). The NLS
has campuses in six different cities across the country182 and provides the
formal vocational training that aspiring lawyers must undertake before being
called to the bar. Although precise numbers are not available, experts project
that today women make-up anywhere from a third to almost one-half of the
student population that is pursuing law as a career.183 Within a generation
then, the Nigerian bar will have more women than it has ever had, and their
demands for equality in all spaces—including within the SBL—will be even
more vocal than they are at present. It is, therefore, incumbent upon the SBLleadership, in its promotion of making Nigeria a rule of law society, to take
greater strides in ensuring that women play a larger and more substantive
role in how the organization’s policies are crafted and ultimately
implemented.
In addition to a gender shift within the Nigerian legal profession, there
has been a growing generational divide between the younger and more senior
SBL lawyers, which has manifested most noticeably on the issue of whether
to liberalize the country’s legal services market. Currently, Nigeria has what
might be called a closed legal labor sector.184 Foreign law firms and foreign
lawyers are prohibited from practicing law within the country or from even
establishing a full-fledged presence.185 (There are “fly-in/fly-out” foreign
lawyers who come in to negotiate or finalize deals, but they can only advise
on their own home jurisdiction’s laws or on international law. And they
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See Krishnan & Ajagbe, supra note 12, at 236 n.283.
Nigerian Law School Campuses & Contact Details, MYSCHOOLGIST (Apr. 27, 2018),
https://www.myschoolgist.com/ng/nigerian-law-school-campuses/.
183
This estimate was based on interviews with respondents that the author had during his time in
Lagos (2017) and Abuja (2018), and in terms of follow-up exchanges with different academics in the
country. See Interview in Lagos, Nigeria (June 18–19, 2017); Author Interviews in Abuja, Nigeria (June
28, 30, 2018).
184
During the two annual SBL conferences in 2017 and 2018, respectively, the author was asked to
deliver remarks on the state of the legal profession in Nigeria and comparatively in other Global South
markets. In both sessions, he was joined on the stage afterwards by a panel of legal experts, where this
topic was intensely discussed and debated. The information in these paragraphs relating to whether
Nigeria should liberalize its legal services market thus comes from these events with these experts. The
audience at both sessions were comprised of practitioners (transactional and litigation), as well as judges,
policymakers, politicians, academics, and students. There were nearly 1,000 audience members at the
Lagos event and approximately 600 at the Abuja session. See author participation in the 2018 annual SBL
meeting, in Abuja Nigeria, (June 29, 2018). See also author participation in the 2017 annual SBL meeting,
in Lagos Nigeria (June 20, 2017).
185
See supra note 184.
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certainly have no standing to practice domestic law or appear in a Nigerian
court. 186)
At present, the debate is over whether the existing regulatory
framework is acceptable as is, or whether changes need to be made. Many of
the familiar arguments heard in other countries are echoed within the
Nigerian context. For those who are in favor of liberalizing the current
regime, they point to how the entry of foreign lawyers into the country will
only accelerate foreign investment.187 After all, foreign companies naturally
want their own lawyers on the ground for consultation and advising
purposes. Liberalizing the legal services sector would also advertise to the
world that Nigeria welcomes globally accepted standards for how clean,
corporate law ought to be practiced.188 In addition, there are many younger
Nigerian lawyers who would like to stay in their home country but who also
seek greater global work opportunities.189 Allowing foreign firms to have a
local presence offers such an option to them, along with providing them the
potential of higher salaries and mentorship by lawyers to whom they
otherwise would not have access.190 If ideas and best practices could be
shared between international and domestic lawyers, it would strengthen the
skill-sets of both sides, with liberalization leading to more business and
enhanced profits for all involved, as well as offering a wider range of services
to clients.191
Many of the more senior lawyers within the SBL, however, see the
entry of foreign lawyers in a different light.192 They argue that Nigerian
clients need, want, and are already satisfied by the services they currently
receive from the domestic bar. By contrast, foreign lawyers do not know the
culture, languages, customs, and context of Nigeria; they only want access
to the Nigerian market for exploitative purposes—business is stagnant in
their own countries and consequently they are looking to “colonize” a new
186

Id.
Id.
188
Id.
189
Id.
190
Id.
191
Id. For other jurisdictions dealing with similar issues and raising similar arguments, see Sida Liu
et al., Mapping the Ecology of China’s Corporate Legal Sector: Globalization and Its Impact on Lawyers
and Society, 3 ASIAN J. L. & SOC’Y. 273 (2016); Sida Liu & Honggi Wu, The Ecology of Organizational
Growth: Chinese Law Firms in the Age of Globalization, 122 AM. J. SOC. 798 (2016); Laurel S.
Terry, Putting the Legal Profession’s Monopoly on the Practice of Law in a Global Context, 82 FORDHAM
L. REV. 2903 (2014); Mary C. Daly & Carole Silver, Flattening the World of Legal Services? The Ethical
and Liability Minefields of Offshoring Legal and Law-Related Services, 38 GEORGETOWN J. INT’L. L. 401
(2007); Jayanth K. Krishnan et al., External Forces, Internal Dynamics: Foreign Legal Actors and Their
Impact on Domestic Affairs, 94 TEXAS L. REV. 995 (2016).
192
See supra notes 184, 191.
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terrain that will bring them new profits. In fact, domestic opponents fear that
because of their size and wealth, foreign lawyers would come to Nigeria,
offer legal services well-below market value, and thereby force local law
firms either to close or be taken-over.193 Thereafter, the foreign lawyers
would stand by themselves and be able to raise rates for their services
without the fear of any domestic competition, and then move into areas such
as courtroom litigation where the vast majority of Nigerian lawyers work.194
Such a scenario has happened in other sectors, and these SBL-opponents see
no reason why it could not happen in the legal services context as well.195
This debate over whether foreign lawyers should enter Nigeria is one
that has been simmering within the SBL for the last few years. It is not likely
that the generational tension will abate any time in the near future. So, what
will the outcome be? At this point, it is difficult to predict. Each side projects
itself to be the protector and promoter of the rule of law and clean governance
in this tussle. The bottom line is that for one side, foreign lawyers would help
the SBL in raising the professional standards of the Nigerian bar; they would
be strong potential partners in the efforts to fight corruption. Yet, the other
side contends that foreign lawyers are the problem, and that their presence
would only exacerbate corrupt behavior within the country. Consequently,
there is a need to keep them at bay.
One middle ground might be to consider phasing-in the liberalization
process, with clearly defined “do’s” and “don’ts” for foreign lawyers if they
are eventually permitted entry into the Nigerian market. For example,
allowing a physical office-presence within the country but restricting foreign
lawyers in their ability to practice and advise only on international law,
international arbitration, and the laws of their home countries could be a
start.196 If, over time, the disruption to the domestic bar was negligible, then
perhaps “best friend partnerships” could be established, whereby a foreign
firm and local firm could join forces, with the assurance that each side’s
interests would be protected.197 An additional phased-in approach that some
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See supra notes 184, 191.
See supra notes 184, 191.
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For a comparative assessment of this issue, see Jayanth K. Krishnan, Globetrotting Law Firms,
23 GEORGETOWN J. LEG. ETHICS 57 (2010) (noting similar arguments made by lawyers in India who
oppose liberalization).
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For a comparative assessment on India, see id. See also Jayanth K. Krishnan, Peel-Off Lawyers:
Legal Professionals in India’s Corporate Law Firm Sector, 9 SOCIO-LEGAL REV. 1 (2013); Krishnan et
al., supra 191.
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For a discussion of this type of partnership, see Jayanth K. Krishnan, The Joint Law Venture: A
Pilot Study, 28 BERKELEY J. OF INTL. L. 431 (2010). Also for related issues, see also David B. Wilkins &
Mihaela Papa, The Rise of the Corporate Legal Elite in the BRICS: Implications for Global Governance,
54 BOSTON COLLEGE L. REV. 1149 (2013); Mihaela Papa & David B. Wilkins, Globalization, Lawyers
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jurisdictions have taken is to allow domestic lawyers to work for a foreign
lawyer or foreign firm, but then to remove that domestic lawyer’s ability to
practice local law so long as such a relationship continues.198
These possible suggestions might allow for a compromise to be reached
between the two sides. More broadly though, such a change to the regulatory
framework could be the SBL’s biggest impact not just on the legal
profession—but also on governmental policy to-date. Nigeria, recall, is
looking to be in the next wave of Global South economic superpowers. For
this transformation to occur, a massive, sustained infusion of foreign
investment will be key. If the lessons of other jurisdictions are indicative,
where foreign investors look to enter markets that are perceived to be freer
and less restrictive, the resulting gradual liberalization of Nigeria’s legal
services market could be an enormously positive signal that the country is
truly open for business.
To ensure that such a process runs smoothly and in a non-corrupt
fashion, what better an organization to take the lead and navigate the
doubtless hurdles that are certain to emerge, than the SBL? The first step,
though, is for the organization to arrive at a consensus on how to proceed. If
such an agreement can be reached, then this vibrant, entrepreneurial group
of lawyers has a real opportunity to change the imagination of how the world
views the Nigerian legal services market and maybe even the country as a
whole. In sum, interested observers eagerly wait to see whether the SBL’s
efforts to inculcate a rule of law culture within Nigerian society will take root
and ultimately succeed.

and India: Toward a Theoretical Synthesis of Globalization Studies and the Sociology of the Legal
Profession, 18 INT’L. J. LEGAL PROF. 175 (2011).
198
This situation exists in places like China and Brazil, for example. For a broader discussion of the
Chinese market, see Liu et al., supra note 191; Liu & Wu, supra note 191. See generally THE BRAZILIAN
LEGAL PROFESSION IN THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION: THE RISE OF THE CORPORATE LEGAL SECTOR AND
ITS IMPACT ON LAWYERS AND SOCIETy (Luciana Gross et al. eds., 2018).
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APPENDIX A
TABLE 1. LIST OF FIRMS THAT WERE IN EXISTENCE WHEN THE SBL WAS BEING
CONTEMPLATED199

Year
Practice Areas

Location

Size (# of
Lawyers)

Website

1991

Commercial
Litigation, Aviation
& Securities

Lagos &
Abuja

80–90

http://www.banwoighodalo.com/

Aluko &
Oyebode

1993

Corporate and
Commercial Legal
Services

Lagos,
Abuja &
Portharco
urt

80–90

http://www.alukooyebode.com/

Olaniwun
Ajayi LP

1962

Banking, Capital
Markets & Finance

Lagos

60– 70

https://www.olaniwunaj
ayi.net/

Templars

1995

Corporate and
Commercial Legal
Services

Lagos &
Abuja

70–80

https://www.templarslaw.com/

Udo
Udoma &
BelloOsagie

1983

Corporate and
Commercial Legal
Services

Lagos,
Portharco
urt &
Abuja

40– 50

http://www.uubo.org/

Simmonsco
oper
Partners

2006

Corporate and
Commercial Legal
Services

Lagos &
Abuja

25– 35

https://scp-law.com/

G. Elias &
Co.

1994

Corporate and
Commercial Legal
Services

Lagos

15– 20

https://www.gelias.com
/

Paul Usoro
& Co.

1985

Project Finance,
Aviation & M &A

Lagos,
Abuja &
Uyo

30–40

https://www.paulusoro.
com/

Law Firms

Banwo &
Ighodalo

199

Esta
blish
ed

This table was compiled by the author’s research assistant, Adebola Adesanya, who is a practicing
lawyer in Nigeria but who came to Indiana University-Bloomington for her LL.M. Because no one
directory is available that provides such information, Ms. Adesanya used multiple sources of
information (existing, incomplete directories, internet searches, information from the bar, and the like)
to put together this table. The author then asked three seasoned, highly reputed corporate lawyers in
Lagos to review the table to see whether this was as complete as possible a listing, to which he received
affirmative responses.
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1987

Commercial
Litigation &
Telecommunication

Lagos,
Abuja &
Portharco
urt

40– 50

http://www.babalakinan
dco.com/

ACAS-Law

1991

Corporate and
Commercial Legal
Services

Lagos,
Abuja &
Portharco
urt

40– 50

http://www.acaslaw.com/

Aelex

2004

Corporate and
Commercial Legal
Services

Lagos,
Abuja &
Portharco
urt

50–60

http://www.aelex.com/

Wole
Olanipekun
& Co.

1980

General Litigation
& Corporate Law

Lagos &
Abuja

20– 25

https://www.woleolanip
ekun.com/

Olajide
Oyewole
LLP

1965

Corporate and
Commercial Legal
Services

Lagos

40–50

http://www.olajideoyew
ole.com/

Detail
Commercia
l Solicitors

1995

Corporate and
Commercial Legal
Services

Lagos

20– 25

http://www.detailsolicit
ors.com/

Odujirin &
Adefulu

1972

Corporate and
Commercial Legal
Services

Lagos &
Abuja

20–25

http://www.odujinrinad
efulu.com/

Streamsow
ers & Kohn

2007

Corporate, Energy
& Aviation

Lagos

25–30

https://www.sskohn.co
m/

Perchstone
& Graeys

1997

Commercial
Litigation, Banking
& Finance

Lagos,
Abuja &
Benin

30– 35

http://www.perchstonea
ndgraeys.com/

Advocaat
Law
Practice

2005

Corporate and
Commercial Legal
Services

Lagos

10–15

http://www.advocaatlaw.com/

Giwa
Osagie &
Co.

1985

Aviation, Capital
Markets & Banking

Lagos &
Abuja

15–25

http://www.giwaosagie.com/

Jackson,
Etti & Edu

1996

Corporate and
Commercial Legal
Services

Lagos,
Abuja &
Ghana

60–70

https://www.jacksonetti
andedu.com/

Olajide
Oyewole
LLP

1965

Corporate,
Intellectual
Property & Finance

Lagos

50–55

http://www.olajideoyew
ole.com/

Babalakin
& Co.
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George
Etomi and
Partners

1984

Corporate and
Commercial Legal
Services

Lagos &
Abuja

14–20

http://geplaw.com/

Femi
Atoyebi &
Co.

1987

Maritime, Energy
&
Telecommunication

Lagos

30–40

http://femiatoyebi.com.
ng/

Punuka
Attorneys
&
Solicitors

1947

Capital Markets,
Real Esate &
Litigation

Lagos,
Abuja &
Asaba

21–25

http://www.punuka.com
/firm.php

Tayo
Oyetibo LP

1991

General Litigation
& Corporate Law

Lagos

15–20

https://tayooyetibolaw.c
om/

SPA
Ajibade &
Co.

1967

Corporate and
Commercial Legal
Services

Lagos

15– 20

http://www.spaajibade.c
om/

CLP Legal

1990

Corporate and
Commercial Legal
Services

Lagos,
Abuja &
Uyo

30– 35

https://www.clplegal.co
m.ng/

BA Law
LLP

1989

Corporate/Commer
cial Litigation &
ADR

Lagos,
Abuja &
Ibadan

15–20

http://www.ba-law.org/

Strachan
Partners

1991

Corporate and
Commercial Legal
Services

Lagos &
Abuja

15–20

http://strachanpartners.c
om/

Abdulai,
Taiwo &
Co

1976

Corporate and
Commercial Legal
Services

Lagos

15–20

https://www.abdulaitai
wo.com/

Bloomfield
Law
Practice

2007

Corporate and
Commercial Legal
Services

Lagos

15–20

http://www.bloomfieldlaw.com/

Copley
Partners

2007

Corporate and
Commercial Legal
Services

Lagos

8–10

http://copleypartners.co
m/

Kenna
Partners

1993

Corporate and
Commercial Legal
Services

Lagos,
Abuja &
Enugu

35–40

http://kennapartners.co
m/

Alegeh and
Co.

1990

Commercial
Litigation & ADR

Lagos,
Abuja &
Edo

25–30

https://www.alegehlaw.
com/

Olisa
Agbakoba
Legal

1983

Insolvency,
Maritime &
Commercial Law

Lagos &
Abuja

25–30

https://oal.law/
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1986

Commercial Law,
Aviation & IP Law

Lagos,
Abuja &
Ilorin

15–20

http://www.bayoojoand
co.org/

2002

Corporate and
Commercial Legal
Services

Lagos,
Abuja &
Portharco
urt

20–25

http://www.alliancelf.co
m/

1st
Attorneys

Corporate and
Commercial Legal
Services

Lagos &
AkwaIbom

8–10

http://1stattorneys.com/

PatreliPartn
ers Legal
Practitioner
s

Litigation,
Arbitration &
Corporate Law

Lagos

8–10

http://www.patrelipartn
ers.com

Bayo Ojo
& Co

Alliance
Law Firm

J. K.
Gadzama
LLP

1989

Capital Markets,
Power &
Commercial Law

Abuja,
Lagos &
Portharco
urt

30–35

http://www.gadzama.co
m/

Izinyon &
Co.

1987

Corporate and
Commercial Legal
Services

Abuja

10–15

http://www.izinyonco.c
om/

1997

Corporate and
Commercial Legal
Services

Abuja,
Lagos &
Portharco
urt

25–30

https://sololaakpana.co
m/

Corporate and
Commercial Legal
Services

Lagos

10–15

https://mikeigbokwe.co
m/

Solola &
Akpana
Mike
Igbokwe,
SAN & Co.
Sofunde
Osakwe
Ogundipe
& Belgore
LP

1989

Corporate and
Commercial Legal
Services

Lagos

10–15

http://www.sooblaw.co
m/

Olawoyin
&
Olawoyin

1976

Commercial Law,
Shipping & ADR

Lagos

10–15

http://olawoyin.com/

Bola
Ajibola &
Co.

~late
1970s

Corporate and
Commercial Legal
Services

Lagos

8–10

https://www.bolaajibola
andco.com/

Maritime, Banking
& Corporate Law

Lagos

8–10

http://jandgattorneys.co
m/

Jireh &
Greys
Attorneys
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1984

Corporate, Banking
& Real Estate

Lagos,
Abuja &
Portharco
urt

8– 10

http://www.kolaawodei
nandco.com/

Ajumogobi
a & Okeke

1984

Aviation, Banking
& Taxation

Lagos &
Abuja

30–35

http://www.ajumogobia
okeke.com/

Tunji
Braithwaite
& Co.

1961

Corporate and
Commercial Legal
Services

Lagos

8–10

https://www.tunjibraith
waiteco.com/

George
Ikoli &
Okagbue

1996

Corporate and
Commercial Legal
Services

Lagos

15–20

http://www.ikoliokagbu
e.com/

Pinheiro
and Co.

1996

Corporate and
Commercial Legal
Services

Lagos &
Abuja

25–30

http://www.pinheirolaw.com/

Aina &
Blankson
Chambers

1991

Corporate and
Commercial Legal
Services

Lagos &
Abuja

8–10

https://www.ainablanks
on.com/

Corporate and
Commercial Legal
Services

Lagos &
Abuja

8– 10

http://www.oditah.com/

Kola
Awodein &
Co.

Fidelis
Oditah &
Co.
Tokunbo
Orimobi
LLP

1979

Corporate and
Commercial Legal
Services

Lagos,
Abuja &
Pretoria

20–30

https://www.tolegalgrou
p.com/

Principles
Law
Partnership

2003

Cormmercial Law,
Oil & Gas & IP

Lagos

20–25

https://www.principlesl
aw.com/

Wali Uwais
& Co.

2003

Corporate &
Project Finance,
Banking & ADR

Abuja

8–10

http://wali-uwais.com/

Corporate and
Commercial Legal
Services

Abuja

8–10

http://www.miyettilaw.
com/

Miyetti
Law
Olujimi &
Akeredolu

1986

Litigation, Real
Estate & Aviation

Abuja &
Ibadan

25–30

http://www.oandalegal.
com/

Paul
Erokoro &
Co.

1984

Capital Markets,
Aviation & ADR

Lagos,
Abuja &
Calabar

10–15

http://www.paulerokoro
law.com/

J.B.
DAUDU
AND CO.

1986

Commercial Law,
Energy & ADR

Abuja,Ka
duna &
Zaria

15–20

http://www.jbdauduand
co.com/
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The New
Practice

Corporate and
Commercial Legal
Services

Lagos

15–20

http://www.tnp.com.ng/

R. A.
LawalRabana &
Co.

Corporate and
Commercial Legal
Services

Lagos,
Abuja &
Ilorin

11–15

https://rabanasan.com/

Corporate and
Commercial Legal
Services

Lagos

15–20

http://thelawcrest.com/

Corporate and
Commercial Legal
Services

Lagos

11–15

http://www.gbclaw.com/

The Law
Crest LLP

1997

Gbenga
Biobaku
and Co.
F.R.A
WILLIAM
S AND
CO.

1943

Commercial Law,
Energy, IP & ADR

Lagos &
Abuja

18–20

https://www.frawilliams
.com/

Duale Ovia
& AlexAdedipe

2016

Admiralty,
Aviation & Capital
Markets

Lagos

10–15

http://doa-law.com/

Sterling
Partnership

1983

Corporate and
Commercial Legal
Services

Lagos

8–10

http://sterlingpartnershi
pgh.com/

Funmi
Roberts and
Co.

1988

Commercial Law,
Banking & Real
Estate

Lagos &
Ibadan

10–15

http://www.funmirobert
sandco.com/

Africa Law
Practice

2017

Corporate and
Commercial Legal
Services

Lagos &
Abuja

20–25

http://www.alp.compan
y/

G.M Ibru
and Co.

1968

Corporate and
Commercial Legal
Services

Lagos

11–15

http://www.gmibruandc
o.com/

Kevin
Martin
Ogwemoh
Legal

1988

Insolvency, Energy
& Commercial Law

Lagos

10–15

http://www.kevinmartin
ogwemoh.legal/

Aidan
Partners

2016

Litigation, D/R,
Banking, Energy,
M&A, Comm.

Lagos

10-15

http://www.aidanpartne
rs.com/

Corporate &
Project Finance, IP
& ADR

Lagos

8–10

https://seftonfross.com/

Sefton
Fross
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F.O
AKINREL
E AND
CO.

1959

Corporate, Banking
& Capital Markets

Lagos

15–20

http://www.foakinrele.c
om/

Akindelano
LP

1972

Corporate and
Commercial Legal
Services

Lagos,
Abuja &
Ibadan

15–20

http://www.akindelano.
com/

TRP LAW

Corporate and
Commercial Legal
Services

Lagos &
Abuja

10–15

https://www.trlplaw.co
m/

Stark Legal
Solicitors

Energy, Transport
& Banking

Lagos

8–10

http://www.starklegalng
.com/

Primera
Africa
Legal

1980

Project Finance,
Probate & IP

Lagos &
Abuja

30–35

http://primeraal.com/

Foundation
Chambers

1999

Maritime,
Corporate Law &
ADR

Lagos

8–10

https://www.foundation
chambers.com/

Corporate and
Commercial Legal
Services

Lagos

10–15

http://akanbiwigwe.com/

Akanbi and
Wigwe
AustenPeters and
Co.

1999

Capital Markets,
Energy & Project
Finance

Lagos &
Abuja

8–10

https://www.austenpeters.com/

Koya &
Kuti

1994

Corporate and
Commercial Legal
Services

Lagos

10–15

https://www.koyakutiso
licitors.com/

Ikeyi &
Arifayan

2005

Corporate, Taxation
& ADR

Lagos,
Abuja &
Enugu

20–25

https://www.ikeyiarifay
an.com/

Dorothy
Ufot and
Co.

1994

Capital Markets,
Corporate Law &
Energy

Lagos

8– 10

http://www.dorothyufot
andco.com/

Idowu
Sofola and
Co.

1975

Corporate and
Commercial Legal
Services

Lagos &
Abuja

15–20

http://www.idowusofola
.com/

Iluyomade
&
Iluyomade

1987

Corporate and
Commercial Legal
Services

Lagos

8–10

http://www.iluyomadela
w.com.ng/

Stillwaters
Law Firm

2001

Corporate and
Commercial Legal
Services

Lagos

8– 10

https://stillwaterslaw.co
m/
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Dikko &
Mahmoud

1993

Capital Markets,
Corporate and
Commercial Law

Abuja &
Kano

20–25

http://www.dikkoandma
hmoud.com/

Citipoint
Legal
Practitioner
s

1990

Corporate and
Commercial Legal
Services

Lagos

20–25

http://citipointchambers
.com.ng/

Ken Ahia
&
Associates

1994

Insolvency,
Corporate &
Commercial Law

Lagos

8– 10

http://kenahialaw.com/

Rickey
Tarfa &
Co.

1988

Aviation,
Insolvency &
Corporate Law

Lagos,
Abuja &
Portharco
urt

45–50

http://www.rickeytarfa.
com/

Emeka
Etiaba &
Co.

1960

Capital Markets,
Aviation &
Corporate Law

Lagos,
Abuja &
Portharco
urt

10–20

http://www.etiabacham
bersng.com/

Corporate and
Commercial Legal
Services

Lagos

10–15

http://www.esherandma
karioslaw.com/

Esher &
Makarios
Adedeji,
Owotomo
&
Associates

1989

Commercial Law,
Banking & IP

Lagos &
Abuja

10–15

https://iplawcentral.com
/

M. A.
Banire &
Associates

1995

Corporate and
Commercial Legal
Services

Lagos &
Abuja

15–20

http://mabandassociates
.com/

Aboyade &
Co.

2009

Corporate and
Commercial Legal
Services

Lagos

8–10

https://www.aboyade.co
m/

Falana &
Falana
Chambers

1991

Litigation, Family
Law & Commercial
Law

Lagos &
Abuja

20–25

https://falanafalana.com
.ng/

Synergy
Attornies

1999

Corporate and
Commercial Legal
Services

Lagos &
Abuja

10–12

http://www.synergyatto
rnies.com.ng/

Babajide
Koku &
Co.

1986

Shipping,
Corporate Finance
& Securities

Lagos,
Abuja &
Portharco
urt

12–15

http://bkclegal.com/

Notes: The total count equals 100 firms.
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